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you have to understand,
that no one puts their children in a boat 
unless the water is safer than the land
 Warsan Shire “Home”1
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Introduction
After the sleepless night of the terror attack (SAADIA 2015) in 
Paris on the 13th of November 2015, just one day after a double 
bomb attack in Beirut2, it seems more urgent than ever to 
critically analyze the migration debate, especially (in notes [1] - 
[3]) in order to disentangle: 
(1) the debate on migration rooted in the humanitarian need to 
help refugees and migrants seeking a safer and better life;
(2) real dangers from cultural extremism against liberal 
democracy and an open society and its values; (3) fear-driven 
culturalist answers to the strategy of chaos, trying to convey 
very basic affective personal and political panic and fear reactions 
(KRUGMAN 2015) that might enforce unreasonable3 security 
measures and right-wing populist restrictions of liberties, instead 
of responsible, wise political action and personal civic courage to 
effectively and sustainably respond to certain immanent threats. 
Therefore I first attempt to put migration into perspective as 
a special case of European inconceivability with a critical 
metaphorology, while breaking up the rhetorical strategy of 
joining or (con-)fusing: [A] terror acts creating real fear with [B] 
the fact of migration and migratory movements and its challenges 
and opportunities for open democratic societies. And by doing so 
I wish to contribute as well to [C] a necessary debate on values 
of liberal and secular democracies, whose laws foster and protect 
the equality of rights, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, 
color of skin, or religious and philosophical convictions of its 
citizens. 
In note [4] I will consider migration not within the framework 
of nation-state borders/-lessness, economic reasons or causal 
links to concepts such as domicide (Porteous and Smith 
2001), but within Villem Flusser’s metaphor of existential 
“groundlessness”. Finally, in a brief note [5] I will merely sketch 
the idea of “conceptual migrations” in a recent example of 
“neuro” migrations to the humanities.
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1. Shipwrecks with [EU] Spectators  
- Critical Metaphorology of Migration 
Metaphors reach out to the “subsoil” (BLUMENBERG 2010, 5), or 
lowest strata, of thought, and the metaphor of shipwrecking can 
be seen as a “thought-image” of travel and change of life, be it 
individual or collective. What interests us first is that metaphors 
such as shipwreck with spectator seem totally inadequate to 
deal with the present death toll of shipwrecking people fleeing 
from Syria, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and other North African 
countries to Europe4, a reality which still tells us about existential 
struggles for a “better” life. Hans Blumenberg focuses on the 
existential metaphor of shipwreck with spectator that lies at the 
beginning of our western Enlightenment age, an important topos 
today for thinking about migration: 
“Those rescued from shipwreck are astonished by their new 
experience of dry land. This is the fundamental experience of 
science, that it is able to establish things that stand firm and provide 
solid ground for further discoveries. It could have been otherwise, 
as it is shown by other ages´ belief in fantastic metamorphoses and 
marvels. The reliability of firm ground is something wholly new 
for humans who are surfacing out of history. Nietzsche compares 
what he calls his happiness to that of the shipwrecked man who 
has “climbed ashore, and now stands with both feet on the firm 
old earth — amazed that it does not rock.” Terra firma is not the 
position of the spectator but rather that of the man rescued from 
shipwreck; its firmness is experienced wholly out of the sense of 
the unlikelihood that such a thing should be attainable at all.” 
(BLUMENBERG 1997, 21-22)
Can migration be put into perspective as a special case of 
European inconceptuality — confronting the freedom of 
movement of its citizens with the possibility of free mobility of 
migrants crossing, diverging and politically transforming our 
view of borders, nation states and citizenship, as they enter the 
EU borders in the year 2015?  
*
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There have been plenty of catastrophe and war metaphors, 
linked especially to contemporary political discourse, describing 
the present human migration to the European Union or inside 
the EU. There is even the concept of migration as an intentional 
“war” strategy (GREENHILL5 2010). But let us start with the 
animal metaphor which refers to the migrants in Calais — trying 
to enter the UK (a non-Schengen territory) — as a “swarm of 
people” (David Cameron).
“This is very testing, I accept that, because you have got a swarm 
of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, 
wanting to come to Britain because Britain has got jobs, it’s got a 
growing economy, it’s an incredible place to live. But we need to 
protect our borders by working hand in glove with our neighbours, 
the French, and that is exactly what we are doing.” David Cameron6 
July 30th 2015 (my emphasis)
Swarm behavior is often attributed to collective group behavior 
of animals; swarm refers specifically to insects such as ants, bees, 
locust, cockroaches, moths, beetles or butterflies, which use — as 
it has been named and artificially modeled — swarm intelligence 
to amplify their collective intelligent strategies by forming real-
time synchronous systems. 
What if — hypothetically — David Cameron didn’t have a 
discriminative, small-minded diminishment of migrants in 
mind, when de-classifying humans as “swarm of people”? What 
if he had thought of an alternative connotation of swarms in the 
sense of highly intelligent groups of decentralized, self-organized 
people, in which swarm intelligence enhances collectively “the 
wisdom of the many”, implying a trans-individual common 
strategy of migrants in order to survive and to continue their 
migration in pursuit of happiness and a better life, even if only 
for economic reasons? 
“Swarms (...) allow users to continually update their intent in real-
time, assessing how their views combine with the other participants 
to achieve an acceptable outcome. In this way, each participant in a 
swarm is not expressing a singular view, but is continually assessing 
his own personal conviction across the range of possible options, 
weighing his confidence and preference in real-time. With all 
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participants doing this in synchrony, the swarm quickly converges 
on solutions that seem to maximize the collective confidence and 
preference of the full group. We believe this is why swarms are able 
so efficiently capture the group’s wisdom.“  (ROSENBERG 2015)
*
Migrants as figures of the other also become metaphorically 
transported to the semantic field of natural catastrophes, e.g. 
of flood or invasion (WITTE 2015); in another extreme case, to 
stay with voices coming from the present British government, 
migrants are being pushed to the field of illegality and crime, 
by being described as “marauding” (Phillip Hammond, British 
Secretary of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs since 
July 2014). 
What is introduced by the image of migrants as marauding (in 
relation to people or animals) is the idea of “groups going around 
a place in search of things to steal or people to attack“7 that 
carries meaning to a political strategy which seeks to justify a 
strict border control system inside Europe with a politics based 
on basic affects, appealing to metaphorological substructures 
of thought. Such strategy which normalizes fear as an operator 
goes to the extreme of pulling out of any responsibility for those 
people trying to cross the borders, leaving them either off shore 
in troubled waters or beyond increasingly higher EU fences, as 
in some countries at the moment. This not only strengthens 
the EU’s outside borders, but overtly contradicts the Schengen 
philosophy of free movement inside the EU and hints at a difficult 
time for the Dublin regulations.  This political metaphor-use has 
rightly been called “toxic” (SHARIATMADARI 2015) for an open 
pluralist debate on the complexities which migration confronts 
us with in multiple respects. The question arises: Is Great Britain 
— as a logical consequence — being actually overwhelmed by 
a kind of “tidal wave” of migration or even a “flood” (DAWAR 
2015), an image of thought that appears in a more moderate form 
as a “stream”8 or “counter stream” of migration, for example 
in Everett Lee’s 1966 “Theory of Migration”? What do these 
geologic water metaphors used in describing migrants and 
migrations convey as real or mapped meaning to the migration 
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debate, and which ethical standards in dealing with migration do 
they suggest? The water metaphoric has been re-appropriated for 
instance in a discourse by the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras 
on the 5th of November 2015, in which he states the necessity of 
helping refugees — for example by taking them out of refugee 
camps such as Lesbos’ — and distributing them to diverse EU 
member countries for a possible start of a better life, even if this 
might be seen only as a “drop of humanity” in an almost infinite 
“ocean of necessity”. However, responsible action towards 
migration (irrespective of migrants being accepted as asylum 
seekers or not) and war refugees might optimistically soon grow 
from a drop to a stream to a dynamic river of responsible action 
towards helping refugees/migrants in Europe: “Thirty in the face 
of thousands who have fled their homes in Syria and Iraq is a 
drop in the ocean,(...) (b)ut we hope that this becomes a stream, 
and then a river of humanity and shared responsibility, because 
these are the principles upon which the European Union was 
built.” (Alexis Tsipras9 2015, my emphasis).
*
And another Latin saying that is inscribed in the emblem of the 
city of Paris, and has served as its motto since at least 1358, went 
viral again after the Paris attacks in November 2015, referring 
not to a shipwreck, but to survival in heavy and difficult times at 
existential seafaring:
«Tossed (ship in heavy sea), but not sunk / Elle est agitée par les 
vagues, et ne sombre pas»: fluctuat nec mergitur (BOUNOUT 
2015).
2. “We Are Here Only an Observer” 
- Moral Responsibility of Being in/off the Route
After entering the topic of a possible absolute metaphor 
of migration with Blumenberg´s existential metaphor of 
shipwrecking with spectator, we quote the current Hungarian 
Prime Minister, Victor Orban, in a most recent reference to 
Hungary in the EU summit on the present migration crisis, after 
having introduced thousands of kilometers of border fence to 
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its neighbors Serbia and Croatia. Hungary, according to Orban, 
was “not (…) on the migration route” anymore and had become 
an outside spectator, a mere (distant) “observer” of the migration 
crisis:
“Hungary is no longer on the route. We are here only an 
observer,” Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Sunday at the 
start of a crisis meeting in Brussels. By fencing the border with 
Serbia and Croatia, Hungary has shifted the refugee route to the 
Western neighboring countries.” 10 (my emphasis).
The problem of the spectator of the shipwreck leads to another 
thought-image of modern migration, that of a “route of 
responsibility”. The contingent avoidance of being on the route 
seems to make countries discard their responsibilities, drawing 
a distinction between the countries on the route which have 
to act and the passive “outside observers” which are, and wish 
to remain, left aside the issues raised by the migrants who are 
entering the heart of Europe. Do we — and that means all EU 
countries — all share the moral responsibility of facing the 
challenges of migration, or is migration just a local problem of the 
specific countries on the route defined by the Dublin Convention? 
Can there be simple transitory “pass-through” countries or 
outside “spectator” countries on the route of migration? Does 
it make any sense to put all the burden on the outer-frontiers 
of the actual EU and not see migration as a challenge for all EU 
member countries? Most positions on migration are influenced 
by frameworks of nation-state thinking in which migration 
becomes a specific problem of being on or off the route of migrant 
movements, and in which migration is seen as destabilizing 
a supposedly homogenous, peaceful national-state order or 
community. This seems rather shortsighted, since it invites to 
overlook the global interconnectedness of national states and 
transnational organizations such as the EU and the call for a) 
transnational spheres of moral responsibility and justice and 
b) a possible global right to freedom of movement. Nation-
state positions taken as absolute values in themselves diminish 
the notion of real pluralistic societies and distort the complex 
international causes of migration, which make people lose their 
homes by war — e.g. the Syrian war at the moment — and other 
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man-made domicides. It has been underlined that there is an 
asymmetry between the rights of immigration on the one hand 
and the rights of emigration on the other.  Emigration — as „voting 
with one’s feet“11 (HANNUM 1987) — has been called the “highest 
form of freedom of movement” (McADAM 2011); Immigration 
though seems not to convey the same legal acceptance of a 
possible freedom of immigration or open borders.
Even if many EU leaders call for limits on migrants/migration, a 
philosophically sound argument for it (“why nation-states may 
be justified in imposing restrictive immigration policies if they 
so choose” (MILLER 2005)) is made difficult by the occupation of 
the debate on limits for immigration by right-wing thinkers and 
groups that try to link Islamic terrorism — e. g. Paris and Brussels 
attacks — with the necessity to close borders for migrants, 
refugees and asylum-seekers. In fact, it is far from being settled 
how to understand limits to (im)migration. While some political 
players call for an absolute numerical limit on how many people 
a country is willing to take in — a view which has been critically 
interpreted as proposing a “Fortress of Europe“ — and try to 
figure out how responsibility should be distributed within the 
EU member states, many argue that the problem is located in 
a dysfunctional EU border control and in the illegal networks 
of traffickers (e.g. between Greece and Turkey). Still, others 
claim that the legal transit at the outer borders of the EU has to 
be secured and made possible in order to limit the speed with 
which migrants are allowed to enter the EU, so that the right for 
seeking asylum can be properly guaranteed. Nevertheless, the 
extreme case of absolute numerical limits on immigration, and 
not only the imposition of relative time-limits for organizational-
logistical purposes of legal registration and humanitarian help, 
has to be seriously considered and debated as a conservative 
constitutional argument12 in a democratic nation state. Indeed, 
it deals with the possibility that “allowing an unlimited right 
of migration would have harmful consequences that outweigh 
the value of freedom of choice” (MILLER 2005; CARENS 1987; 
HAMPTON 1995), and poses the question whether states are still 
allowed, today, to secure their borders with police —  or even 
military —  force against entering migrants.
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For MILLER (2005), limits on immigration are also coupled with 
rights and duties of citizenship within the state one wishes to 
immigrate to, such as the acquisition of linguistic and other skills 
“they require to function as active citizens,” because “democratic 
states must bring immigrants into political dialogue with natives.” 
Here MILLER proposes a strategy that sees as inacceptable  “the 
emergence of a permanent class of non-citizens, whether these are 
guest workers, illegal immigrants, or asylum seekers waiting to 
have their applications adjudicated,(...)”, since he understands 
“democratic states as political communities formed on the basis of 
equality among their members, and just as this gives such states the 
right to exclude, it also imposes the obligation to protect the equal 
status of all those who live within their borders.” (MILLER 2005, 205)
*
On the other hand, the acceptance of migrants and asylum-seekers 
should be debated in relation to the philosophical position that 
can be called the “case for open migration” (KUKATHAS 2005), 
as imagined in the metaphor of the “open door”, an ethical topos 
that should be reanalyzed today. Especially in cases such as the 
Syrian refugees, who have lost the notion of national borders as 
formerly imposed from the outside (e.g. by colonial politics), 
the idea of “open borders” (FISK 2015) might still be the only 
freedom possible to live and search for a better life in a globalized 
economy and information society.
3. On the “Terra Incognita of the Spectator”
Martin Bachmann, categorized in the news after his heroic deed 
as “a German with a Kurdish migrant background” (BAUMANN 
2015) — while I was writing this text — hindered a terror act on 
the 17th of October 2015. It was a politically motivated knife attack 
to the Cologne mayor candidate, the independent Henriette 
Reker, a former responsible for the integration of migrants in the 
city. Bachmann prevented the attack to the now elected mayor 
from being lethal, screaming whilst defending Reker and others 
that were injured by the terror act: “Why do you want to kill?” 
Afterwards, Bachmann underlined the motivation for his brave 
and fearless attitude:
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“I came to Germany because of democracy and freedom and I 
am committed to defend these values. I am aghast that there 
are people with us here, for whom these values do not count 
anything. We must be vigilant.” (BACHMANN cit. in BAUMANN 
2015) 
We can take Martin Bachmann’s courageous act and his 
justification as an example of what Slavoj Zizek has in mind 
when he refers to the “opportunities” that the recent “wave” of 
migration presents Europe — and Germany in specific — with. It 
appears as a kind of theoretical and metaphorical therapeutics of 
“strengthening”, a remedy for the “core” of Europe that has been 
“weakened” by the European bureaucracy and the capitalist 
markets, and that, for Zizek, needs an “emancipatory project” 
against the “disease” of right-wing movements in the beginning 
of the 21st century: 
“If we take migrants seriously and come to terms with them, it 
can be an opportunity for Europe, an emancipatory project, in 
which we strengthen the core of Europe. This is the only way to 
leave right-wing populists no chance.” ZIZEK (2015) 
However, this philosophical optimistic and metaphorical 
theoretical spectator view of the European shipwreck facing 
cultural extremism connects and opposes metaphorical-
theoretical debates and facts of migration, on the one hand, with/
to right wing culturalist ideology, on the other. However, these 
are not obviously linked by a causal nexus, even if they are often 
presented as such: migration and right-wing movements in this 
metaphorical relation should ideally counterbalance each other. 
Migration and migrants are thus metaphorically put into a strange 
counterweight position to parties/movements in Europe that 
wish to exclusively determine national or religious “identities” 
and national culture. In the debate around critical views of 
multiculturalism (ERIKSON and STJERNFELT 2012; STJERNFELT 
and ERIKSON 2009; 2015) and culturalism in general, the lack of 
universal values both from radicalized Muslims as well as from 
extreme rightists and national conservatives hints towards a 
political myth and national ontology of culture, in which, in 
both cases, a group value is attributed to a predominant and 
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teleological “culture“ which, when critically scrutinized, shows 
to lie in an open confrontation with universalist — not necessarily 
only historical European enlightenment — values, such as free 
speech (ERIKSON and STJERNFELT 2015) or a plural and secular 
society bound by the respect of common laws independent of 
cultural and religious self-definition: 
“Culturalism has an entire range of categories in common 
with nationalism; indeed, nationalism in reality constitutes a 
subvariant of culturalism, in which a single culture provides 
the basis for the state. Therefore it does not come as a surprise 
that the present nationalist renaissance in European politics 
makes use of culturalist ideas to a great extent.” (ERIKSON & 
STJERNFELT 2009, 1)
*
Culturalism as an ideology shouldn´t be confused with concrete 
cultural expression nor with the attempt to build communities 
and foster an understanding of values in open societies between 
different peoples and different cultures through works of 
arts, books, music, theatre, dance, design and other cultural 
expressions. The reaction of the Italian Prime Minister thus 
comes without surprise, when he emphasizes the importance to 
invest in access to culture for our youth as a collective response 
and prevention of terrorism or small-minded culturalism: “They 
imagine terror, we respond with culture. They destroy statues, we 
love art. They destroy books, we are the country of bookstores” 
(RENZI 2015; 25.11.2015). Even if I am not sure whether this kind of 
“culture clash” of “us” and “them” and its pre-supposed learning 
stimulus in Renzi’s political declaration will bear fruit, the idea 
reminds me of us being linked to a universal library13 as a strange 
metaphor and thought-image of migration, as one among many 
possible movements in continuous imaginary and conceptual 
migrations-homes and even migration-utopias with which we 
live by. This library image conveys universal values of mankind, 
shown in writers such as Elias Canetti or Jorge Luis Borges, but in 
the end is actually unable to be completely understood from or 
circumscribed to the perspective of one of the culture-galleries 
and its histories of reading and moving inside the infinite library: 
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“The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an 
indefinite and perhaps infinite number of hexagonal galleries.
(...) The Library is a sphere whose exact centre is any one of its 
hexagons and whose circumference is inaccessible.” (Borges 1964, 
62-63)
4. On “Taking Up Residence in Homelessness” (Villem Flusser)
This note will deal with the Prague-born Villem Flusser and 
his autobiographical Brazilian deceptions/discoveries entitled 
“Taking up Residence in Homelessness / Wohnung beziehen in 
der Heimatlosigkeit” (FLUSSER 2002), in which Flusser explains 
his point of view of being inhabited by several homelands and 
not being able to affix his way of thinking and modes of being 
to one single or “original” home. As he has been raised in and 
has interacted with several cultures, he developed the possibility 
of being able to think in and of being woven into the fabric of 
various languages — a possibility that calls for a permanent 
cultural effort of multiple translations of a differentiated and 
synthesized modern identity, which is unable to single out or 
select a singular and unified “higher” cultural root: 
“It goes against my own nature, but, having been seduced by my 
own topic, “Home and Homelessness,” I now intend to make the 
secret of my homelessness a little clearer. I was born a citizen 
of Prague, and it seems that my ancestors lived more than a 
thousand years in the Golden City. I am a Jew, and the saying 
“Next year in Jerusalem” has been with me since my youth. 
For decades, I was involved in an experiment to synthesize 
Brazilian culture from a larger mix of Western European, Eastern 
European, African, East Asian, and Indian cultural phenomena. I 
live in a village in Provence, and I have become woven into the life 
fabric of this timeless neighborhood. I was raised in the German 
culture, and I have been involved in German cultural life for 
several years. In short, I am homeless, because there are so many 
homelands that make their home in me. (...)In this respect, I have 
two experiences that contradict one another. All of the people to 
whom I was mysteriously bound in Prague were murdered. All of 
them. The Jews in gas chambers, the Czechs in the Resistance, 
the Germans on the Russian front. All of the people to whom I 
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was mysteriously bound in São Paulo are living, and I am still in 
contact with them.” FLUSSER (2002, 95)
For Flusser, the freedom that the migrant acquires through his 
journey (in Flusser’s case caused by an imposed exile) is different 
from a romantic journey that, at the core, is devoid of existential 
difficulties and existential homelessness. The mode of freedom 
given to the migrant entails a specific form, it is an “elective 
affinity”14, not the biological or native freedom of an amplified 
social responsibility beyond the existential thrownness of being 
born in a certain country, time or culture without being able to 
choose so:
“These are the dialogic threads of responsibility and of answering 
for another. Is the freedom of the migrant, this “spirit” who 
belongs nowhere, a solipsistic freedom devoid of responsibility? 
Has he attained his freedom at the cost of being with others? Or 
is solitude devoid of responsibility not, rather, the migrant’s fate 
(just as the Romantic poets described it)? (...) It was my birth that 
threw me into my first homeland, without anyone asking me if 
this was something I wanted. The chains that bound me there 
to my neighbors were, for the most part, placed on me. In my 
now hard-won freedom, it is I who ties the binds that connect me 
to my neighbors, in cooperation with them. The responsibility 
that I have toward my neighbors is not something that has been 
imposed upon me, but rather that I have accepted for myself. 
Unlike the one who is left behind and who remains mysteriously 
chained to his neighbors, I am instead bound to them by my own 
free will.” (FLUSSER 2002, 94-95)
The question inherent to Flusser’s interesting approach to taking 
up residence in homelessness is whether one can attain a more 
conscious notion of home. It comes close to the Kleistian idea of 
a second innocence; of having been expelled from the Garden of 
Eden in the first place, traveling and migrating around the world, 
and just after all the effort and pain of the existential journey 
forgetting the “original” home to see if a second kind of home, 
a conscious migrant home, more open to the idea of migration 
and existential homelessness, would be possible as immigration 
into a home:
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“The secret codes of homes are not made of conscious rules, 
but rather spun from unconscious habits. What characterizes 
the habit is the fact that one is not conscious of it. The person 
without a home must first consciously learn the secret codes and 
then forget them, to be able to immigrate into a home.” (FLUSSER 
2002, 95).
Nevertheless, for Flusser this becoming conscious about home is 
not only an enthusiastic endeavor, since it de-sacralizes or even 
banalizes the sanctuaries of the native inhabitants:  
“The disappointment with Brazil was the discovery that every 
home is nothing more than the sacralization of the banal, whether 
one is born into it or one is involved in its synthesis. Whatever 
its shape, home is nothing more than a place to live surrounded 
by mysteries. If one wants to preserve the hard-won freedom 
of homelessness, then one must withstand participating in this 
mystification of habits. In the case of my Brazilian experience, 
I have to preserve the connections that I established there, 
because I am responsible to my Brazilian neighbors, just as 
they are responsible to me. However, I have to establish other 
connections outside Brazil, and I have to integrate my Brazilian 
experience into my new connections. Brazil is not my home. 
Instead, “home” is the people to whom I am responsible.” 
(FLUSSER 2002, 99) 
Thus Flusser introduces two other metaphors related to the 
migrant. The migrant as window and mirror:
“The migrant is a man of a coming future world without homes. 
(...) He is both a window and a mirror: natives can see the world 
through him and, at the same time, they see themselves, if 
only in a distorted view. (...) The loss of the original, barely 
acknowledged mystery of home opens him up to a different sort 
of mystery: to the secret of being with the Other. His problem 
is this: How can I overcome the prejudices that lie inside the 
mysteries that I have carried with me? How can I break through 
the prejudices of my neighbors who embody mystery? How will 
I join together with them to create beauty out of ugliness? In this 
respect, every person without a home is—at least, potentially—
the clear consciousness of all natives as well as a messenger of 
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the future. Thus, I believe that we migrants must accept this 
function as our profession and our calling.” (FLUSSER 2002, 102)
5. Notes on Conceptual [“Neuro-“] Migrations to the 
Humanities
Finally, I shall consider now the metaphor of conceptual 
migrations, referring to concepts that can be seen as disciplinary 
war machines and to their nomadic mobility, which can 
originate interdisciplinary transformations across the sciences: 
This brief note will merely sketch a recent example of “neuro” 
migrations to disciplines of the humanities (such as, for example, 
“neuroaesthetics”, “neuroethics”, “neuro-enhancements” or 
“neurotheology”, among others).
“Since the proclamation of the Decade of the Brain in the 
1990s, the neurosciences worked a triumphant success without 
precedent. Far beyond the boundaries of the natural sciences, 
explanatory models arising from brain research are currently 
invading the fields of social sciences and the humanities. There 
is scarcely a science discipline resistant to the attempts of being 
modernized by the “neuro-“ prefix, leading to the epidemic 
emergence of novel neuro-disciplines such as neurospirituality, 
neurotheology, neurophilosophy, neuroethics, neuroeconmics, 
neuromarketing, neuropsychoanalysis, neuroanthropology, 
neuroeducation and neuroesthetics, to name but a few.” HASLER 
(s.d.) 
A specific philosophical task must be followed when reflecting 
upon the foundations of enhanced humanities, as a consequence 
of research on conceptual migrations: a metaphorology of 
concepts like “Neuro-”, which transcend disciplinary borders 
and change the proper idea of the discipline in question in the 
humanities. I work with the ideas of (conceptual) machines 
and conceptual migrations in which prefixes like “Neuro-” can 
be seen as indicators of new conceptual frameworks as well as 
interdisciplinary strategies and practices (POMBO 2004,73-104) 
of a) importation, in which the import is made according to 
the interest of the importing discipline; b) crossing, which deal 
with practices and strategies having their origin in a particular 
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discipline, radiating to others, invading other areas, circulating 
and by that revealing themselves as interdisciplinary problems; 
c) convergence of perspectives determined by the analysis 
of a determined object in a restricted area without structural 
modification of the involved disciplines; d) decentration/
deviation/polycentrism, originated by problems that cannot 
be reduced to traditional disciplines. The new problems treated 
could be of technological origin or derived from a post-normal 
science situation in which we have to deal with technical 
uncertainty (methodological uncertainty; epistemological 
uncertainty (ignorance); societal uncertainty (limited social 
robustness))  or even with man-made problems that did not exist 
before, problems that by their inherent complexity cross and 
migrate from one discipline to the other. And I would also add e) 
disciplinary take-over/complete absorption, in which concepts 
and their metaphysical and epistemic frames can operate a 
substantial transformation of thought in a variety of disciplines 
in the humanities. This is the reason why I want to focus on 
the current example of conceptual “Neuro-” migrations to the 
humanities. These are important for evaluating the values, scopes 
and the epistemological limits (the possible cognitive biases) of 
brain-enhancements, mind interventions, mood alterations, and 
their enhancement and control of the imagination of traditional 
disciplines such as philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, politics, policy 
making and education: 
“At present, various disciplines described using the prefix ‘neuro’ 
(...), are attempting to supplant the concept of the mind. Basically, 
what is happening is that the knowledge accumulated over 
decades of psychological and neuropsychological study is being 
presented as a novelty under new names (...), neuropsychology 
is perfectly capable of covering all aspects of the study of the 
mind–brain relationship. Why then is there currently a tendency 
to fragment it into other disciplines? Is it to give the impression 
that new branches of knowledge have come into being alongside 
psychology and neuropsychology? Often the appeal exerted by 
innovations, especially to the layman, can be attributed purely 
to their novelty. Today, new fields of research characterized by 
a short circuit between the traditional spheres of knowledge—
such as economy, ethics, politics, and even theology—and 
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the discoveries made regarding how the brain functions are 
appearing on the scene.” (LEGRENZI and UMILITÁ 2013, VI)
Let me give just one example: neuroethics (CLAUSEN and LEVY 
2015). A double task is attributed to this upcoming discipline, 
based upon the distinction made by ROSKIES (2002) between 
the ethics of neuroscience, which applies traditional ethical 
principles used to monitor research around the world (such as 
respect for persons, concerns for welfare, and justice), and the 
neuroscience of ethics (GREENE 2013). An alternative approach 
to neuroethics is endorsed by NORTHOFF (2009), who focuses 
on the fact-norm circularity of neuroethical concepts, which beg 
for epistemological clarification. Another possibility would be 
RACINE (2010) and his pragmatic neuroethics, as well as BLANK’s 
(2013) policy approach, which introduces questions related to 
moral action and policy making that have become important. 
Others still argue for a new research field in the contact zone of 
(neuro-)science, health, medicine, society and policy making, 
dealing with the new epistemological (RAMOS-ZÚÑIGA 2014; 
2015), ethical and societal problems posed by neuroethics and by 
its conceptual migration to the fields of the humanities.
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(Endnotes)
1 Excerpt from the poem “Home,” by Warsan Shire 
2 “Isis claims responsibility as suicide bombers kill dozens 
in Beirut“. The Guardian (12.11.2015). Online: http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/12/beirut-bombings-kill-at-
least-20-lebanon.
3 As KRUGMAN (2015) puts it: “A much bigger risk, in practice, is 
that the targets of terrorism will try to achieve perfect security by 
eliminating every conceivable threat — a response that inevitably 
makes things worse, because it’s a big, complicated world, and 
even superpowers can’t set everything right.”
4 “We know that 10,000 desperate migrant people have been 
rescued by Italian coastguards and the navy since last Friday. It 
is time to recognize that the Italian, Greek and Spanish maritime 
rescuers urgently need much more EU solidarity and support.” 
The Guardian (16.04.2015), “Europe’s shame over migrant boat 
people”. Online:  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
apr/16/europe-shame-migrant-boat-people.
5 In the documentation of an actual accusation of the German 
chancellor and vice-chancellor of treason (http://www.institut-
fuer-asylrecht.de/26561.pdf) it becomes clear that the idea of 
an “intentional war plan” is supposed as if migrants would use 
their migration as a forced migration war strategy into the EU and 
Germany. The inherent metaphor of “weapon of mass migration” 
is presented as being ideologically and theoretically underlying 
the accusation, using the study of Kelly M. Greenhill (2010). 
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8 “Migration tends to take place largely within well defined 
streams.” (LEE 1966, 54).
9 TSIPRAS, A. (2015), cit. in “Refugee crisis: Greece carries out 




10 Translated from the German Handelsblatt (25.10.2015), 
according to DPA/Reuters: “Gipfeltreffen zur Flüchtlingskrise, 




11 “There is no doubt that the right to ‘vote with one’s feet’ — 
whether to escape persecution, seek a better life, or for purely 
personal motives having nothing to do with larger political or 
economic issues — may be the ultimate means through which the 
individual may express his or her personal liberty.“ Hannum, H. 
(1987). The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and 
Practice. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
12 See SCHOLZ, R. (2015). “Wir verteidigen Europas Werte. 




13 “The best definition of a home was a library.” Elias Canetti, 
Auto-da-Fé.
14 “Thus, I recognized what makes patriotism (whether local or 
national) so devastating: it anoints the human ties that bind and 
thus neglects the ties that we accept freely; it privileges family 
ties to elective affinities, the real or imagined biological relations 
to those of friendship and love. I fell into a fever of freedom: I was 
free to choose my neighbor.“ (Flusser 2002)
